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HOW LIBERATED WAS JUDGE 
JEROME FRANK?t 
Michael E. Smith* 
A MAN'S REACH: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUDGE JEROME FRANK. 
Edited by Barbara Frank Kristein. Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press. 1977. (Reprint of the edition published by Mac-
millan, New York, in 1965). Pp. xxvii, 450. $26. 
Professor Edmond Cahn's introduction to this volume pro-
vides a handy biographical sketch of Jerome Frank. 
Born in New York in 1889, he practiced law in Chicago and New 
York for a number of years, created a sensation in 1930 when he 
published the controversial Law and the Modern Mind, became 
one of the most creative figures in President Roosevelt's New Deal, 
held important posts in the AAA and SEC, and in 1941 became a 
judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
where he served until his death in 1957. Meanwhile, besides lec-
turing at Yale Law School and writing several books, the most 
important of which was Courts on Trial (1949), Judge Frank 
played a ubiquitous role as leader in libertarian and humanitarian 
causes. [P. ix] 
The first judicial opinion by Frank I ever saw was in the 
contracts casebook I used as a first-year law student.' The case 
concerned nothing more lively than the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements, but I can still remember my surprise and delight 
when I encountered the extract. It had a strong intellectual ap-
peal compounded of broad learning, wit, sharp insights, and co-
gency. Moreover, the extract displayed an iconoclasm calculated 
to please the cocky tyro. Not only was Frank sharply critical of 
past doctrine; he proposed that judges had been hyper-
rationalistic, incoherent, venal, and extremely foolish. All of this 
made me an instant Jerome Frank fan. 
Frank's nonjudicial writings, especially Law and the Mod-
ern Mind and Courts on Trial, will probably continue to be read 
widely by students of law. His judicial opinions, on the other 
hand, like those of nearly all judges, will become increasingly 
obsolete and perhaps finally vanish from notice; in the later edi-
t Copyright ©Michael E. Smith 1979. Part of the work on this Review was done with 
support from the William Nelson Cromwell Foundation to whom I express my gratitude. 
• Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. B.A. 1956, Haverford Collel(e; 
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1942), reprinted in J. DAWSON & w. HARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS AND 
CONTRACT REMEDIES 267-68 (1959). 
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tions of that contracts casebook, for example, all reference to 
Frank's opinion on arbitration has been removed. As time passes, 
fewer and fewer students and lawyers with tastes similar to mine 
will experience the surprise and delight of encountering their first 
of many Frank opinions. 
The reprinting of A Man's Reach, which includes twenty of 
Frank's opinions as well as extensive extracts from his non-
judicial writings, is therefore very welcome. It will help to intro-
duce the opinions, albeit in an expensive format, to future genera-
tions of readers in law. Here I want to describe for those unfamil-
iar with Frank as a judge the pleasures that may await them in 
this volume and also to point out certain characteristics of 
Frank's judicial work that may not be so obvious. 
Most of the opinions in this book are well chosen to convey 
the qualities I first enjoyed in Frank's work; that is to say, most 
are highly discursive. The only disadvantage in this selection is 
that readers may be misled about Frank's ordinary output. ·Many 
of his opinions, especially later in his career, were quite tradi-
tional in content and style, and some were even terse. These are 
perhaps best represented in this volume by United States ex rel. 
Leyra v. Denno and United States v. Field. 
The editor has wisely included some of Frank's opinions on 
subjects of popular interest. The appendix to United States v. 
Roth has Frank's famous discourse on the constitutionality of 
obscenity laws. His opinion affirming the convictions and death 
sentences of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for espionage is here. 
Baseball fans can read Frank's views on an antitrust suit brought 
by ballplayers blacklisted for having jumped to the Mexican 
League after World War II. Those curious about Frank's position 
in causes celebres will also want to see his concurring opinion in 
United States v. Sacher, 2 affirming the contempt penalties im-
posed on the defense lawyers following the trial of the top Com-
munist leaders under the Smith Act; unfortunately the opinion 
is omitted from this volume. 
My main difficulty with the selection of cases is the repeti-
tion of subject matter. All but four of the twenty cases concern 
civil or criminal procedure, arid four of these are mainly about the 
problem of "harmless error."3 Readers may benefit from this in 
certain ways. The repetition enables Frank's points to sink in 
2. 182 F.2d 416, 453-63 (2d Cir. 1950). 
3. That is, when an appellate court thinks an error was committed at trial, it must 
then determine whether the error was harmful enough to necessitate a retrial. See 28 
u.s.c. § 2111 (1976); FED. R. CIV. P. 61; FED. R. CRIM. P. 52. 
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more deeply, in accord with one of his favorite canons of persua-
sion (see p. xxvii). The subjects are accessible to nonexperts. 
They gave rise to the sharpest disagreements between Frank and 
his colleagues on the Second Circuit, which provides an element 
of dialogue to the cases. The selection also connects the opinions 
with the extracts from Frank's nonjudicial writing, which mostly 
concern fact-finding by courts. Still, readers may find the repeti-
tion somewhat tedious and yearn for a richer mixture of cases. 
From the many Frank opinions on other subjects that are discur-
sive and relatively comprehensible. I have selected an even dozen, 
well-known within the profession, which I recommend to those 
wishing to explore Frank's judicial work further.4 
The book has a general introduction by Professor Edmond 
Cahn and a preface by Justice Douglas, both close friends of 
Frank. These provide biographical information and personal por-
traits helpful to the reader's understanding of Frank's tempera-
ment. Neither says much that is useful about his judicial work; 
indeed, Cahn's analysis of Frank as a "paragon of trimmers" (p. 
xii) strikes me as misleading.5 There are also brief case introduc-
tions by the editor, Frank's daughter. 
Readers will find the editing of the cases generally unobstru-
sive. Occasionally, crucial facts are omitted from both Frank's 
opinions and the short introductions. Relying solely on this book, 
it is impossible, for example, to appraise the claim of judicial 
unfairness in United States v. Rosenberg (pp. 294-96) or the argu-
4. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 974-82 (2d Cir. 1948) (dis-
senting opinion) (desirability of trade-name protection); Repouille v. United States, 165 
F.2d 152,154-55 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion) ("good moral character" for naturaliza-
tion); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (summary judgment); Ricketts v. 
Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-70 (2d Cir. 1946) (concurring opinion) (releases of 
liability by injured workmen); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37-43 (2d 
Cir. 1945) (desirability of trade-name protection); Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc, 
v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943) (consumer rights in the administrative process); 
Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942) (hearsay evidence); Picard v. United 
States Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 638-45 (2d Cir. 1942) (concurring opinion) (desirability 
of the patent system); Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1942) 
(judicial attitudes toward administrative agencies); Kulukundis Shipping Co, v. Amtorg 
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942) (judicial attitudes toward arbitration); M. 
Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 954-69 (2d Cir. 1942) (dissenting 
opinion) (freedom of contract); Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc,, 121 F.2d 336 (2d 
Cir. 1941) (releases of liability by injured workmen). 
5. In this context, trimmers in part are those who "lsetl themselves in extreme 
opposition to the majority of their time and [seek! to counterpoise the majority's exagger-
ations and distortions" (p. xi). Compare Cahn's analysis with my comments below, text 
at notes 18-21 infra, about Frank's stance in Communist-related cases and his penchant 
for overargument. 
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ment that the judge's charge in United States v. Antonelli Fire-
works Co. cured the prosecutor's misconduct {p. 326). The omis-
sion of cited cases, and sometimes of entire passages of case anal-
ysis, most notably in Antonelli Fireworks, makes it more difficult 
to evaluate Frank's handling of precedent. The entire first section 
of Frank's dissent in Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corp. has also 
been excluded, depriving the reader of some particularly sharp 
insights into Frank's judi~ial approach. Finally, the omission of 
most footnotes diminishes the impression that the opinions give 
of Frank's extraordinarily wide interests and reading. Yet these 
are relatively small obstacles to the reader's enjoyment and stim-
ulation.6 
As I mentioned at the start, one potential source of enjoy-
ment in Frank's judicial work is its intellectual character. First, 
in dealing with legal questions Frank was apt to resort to an 
interesting variety of nonlegal materials. The famous appendix 
to United States v. Roth displays this trait vividly. There, in 
discussing the constitutionality of obscenity laws, Frank drew 
heavily on historical and sociological data concerning such mat-
ters as the literary tastes of the framers, Victorian sexual mores, 
the effect of pornography on adults and children, and pornogra-
phy in classical literature. He also quoted the speculations of 
Milton, J.S. Mill, Macaulay, Goethe, Carl Becker, Franklin 
Roosevelt, Spinoza, and Jimmy Walker, and even resorted to his 
private correspondence with a psychologist. 
The opinions in this volume are also full of clever asides, 
legal and nonlegal. Some are merely witty, others are trenchant; 
for me they are the best things in the opinions. Here is a sample. 
Responding to the "apparent paradox" that the first amendment, 
in the name of the democratic process, may invalidate the fruits 
of that process: "The paradox is unreal: The Amendment ensures 
that public opinion . . . shall not commit suicide through legisla-
tion which chokes off today the free expression of minority views 
which may become the majority public opinion of tomorrow" {p. 
135) (emphasis in original). Speaking of the power of juries to 
decide according to their own views of the law: "[M]ost writers 
on jurisprudence . . . would do well to modify their ideas by 
recognizing what might be called 'juriesprudence'" (p. 262). Ac-
knowledging psychological arguments against special jury ver-
6. Connoisseurs of the opinions of notable judges may wish to compare THE ART AND 
CRAIT OF JUDGING: THE DECISIONS OF JUDGE LEARNED HAND (H. Shanks ed. 1968), now 
regrettably out of print. The selection and editing of the opinions are excellent, and so 
are the extensive commentaries. 
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diets: "Seperation [sic] of a decision into 'law' and 'fact' compo-
nents ... [may] be 'too logical,' in the sense that it excludes 
that 'intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up 
many unnamed and tangled impressions, impressions which may 
lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth'" (p. 269). 
"[T]o the question whether the difference between a difference 
of kind and difference of degree is itself a difference of degree, the 
sage answer has been given that it is a difference of degree, but a 
'violent' one" (p. 314). "[T]he judge's cautionary instruction 
may do more harm than good: It may emphasize the jury's aware-
ness of the censured remark-as in the story by Mark Twain of 
the boy told to stand in the corner and not think of a white 
elephant" (p. 333). Denouncing the "one-word-one-meaning" fal-
lacy: "Similar reasoning would compel the conclusion that a 
clotheshorse is an animal of the equine species, and make it im-
possible to speak of drinking a toast" (p. 425). 
Most notable of all, many of the opinions printed here con-
tain long, cogent essays on a variety of legal topics; often these 
are only remotely related to the cases. One of the most widely 
known is Frank's compelling discourse on special jury verdicts in 
Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. There he pointed out, 
among other things, the declining status of juries in other demo-
cratic countries; the scope that general verdicts gave to jury law-
lessness and prejudice; the grave difficulties in reviewing general 
verdicts; the assistance to accurate fact-finding given by special 
verdict forms; the inability of juries to grasp legal instructions, 
and the consequent folly of overturning verdicts because of faulty 
instructions; and the opportunity afforded by special verdicts for 
dispensing with most instructions. Admittedly, Frank did not 
consider the objections to some of these contentions, nor did he 
discuss any of the practical problems in using special verdicts; yet 
he did carefully canvass opposing considerations based on the 
psychology of making decisions. I think readers will find the dis-
course most impressive. 
Although I have emphasized the idiosyncratic aspects of 
Frank's opinions, since they evidence most clearly his intellectual 
powers, Frank could also perform traditional legal exercises effec-
tively. Here are some examples from the book. His capacity for 
sensitive observation and presentation of factual detail is shown 
in two confession cases (pp. 342-43, 369-70) and in his analysis of 
the testimony of an eavesdropping policeman (pp. 360-61). Le-
gally trained readers will enjoy Frank's deft handling of precedent 
in distinguishing an old Supreme Court ruling that organized 
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baseball is not subject to the Sherman Act (pp. 313-14) and in 
demolishing an opponent's authorities in United States u. Field 
(pp. 397-401). A judge~s capacity for sharp analysis is well-tested 
by lurking choice of law questions, a test Frank passed with high 
honors in United States u. Forness (p. 430). Finally, his opinions 
concerning harmless error, especially United States u. 
Rubenstein and United States u. Antonelli Fireworks Co., dem-
onstrate Frank's ability to construct a persuasive doctrinal argu-
ment. Somewhat spruced up, it ran as follows: Appellate courts 
have no opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses as a 
guide to their credibility. Therefore, in the ordinary case they are 
in a poor position to assess the strength of the evidence on either 
side. That means, in turn, that they can hardly gauge accurately 
the iikelihood that the verdict would have been the same even if 
errors at trial had not been committed. We have a constitutional 
policy of allowing juries to decide uncertain questions of fact, 
especially in criminal cases. Moreover, since they see the wit-
nesses they are better placed than appellate courts to find the 
facts accurately. Therefore, in any case of significant doubt about 
the harmfulness of an error, the matter should be sent back for 
retrial. This argument, although not conclusive, is at least very 
powerful. 
Readers may also delight in Frank's iconoclasm, his propen-
sity to thumb his nose at traditional legal ways. The main target 
of this iconoclasm was the commitment of lawyers and judges to 
general rules and binding precedents. At his mildest, Frank con-
tended that the commitment was greatly exaggerated. In Aero 
Spark Plug Co. u. B.G. Corp., for example, he argued at length 
that judges were too preoccupied with the pi:ecedential implica-
tions of their own decisions; they ought to concern themselves 
mainly with a just disposition of the cases before them. Corre-
spondingly, judges should be much more willing to disregard un-
desirable precedents laid down by others (pp. 444 ff.).7 Frank 
acted on the latter view in a number of cases in this volume, 
including Gardella u. Chandler, United States u. St. Pierre, and 
United States v. Forness. 
More drastic was Frank's belief that rules and precedents 
could not possibly be of much real significance because of their 
inherent indeterminacy. For this view readers must refer mainly 
to the extract from Law and the Modern Mind, published ten 
7. See also United States v. Forness (pp. 429-30). 
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years before he became a judge, but it is echoed in at least one 
case here in which Frank wrote, 
The conventions of judicial opinion-writing-the uncolloquial 
vocabulary, the use of phrases carrying with them an air of finality, 
the parade of precedents, the display of seemingly rigorous logic 
bedecked with "therefores" and "must-be-trues"-give an impres-
sion of certainty (which often hypnotizes the opinion-writer) con-
cealing the uncertainties inherent in the judging process. On close 
examination, our legal concepts often resemble the necks of the 
flamingos in Alice in Wonderland which failed to remain suffi-
ciently rigid to be used effectively as mallets by the croquet play-
ers. [Pp. 323-24] 
Frank also believed that rules and precedents were of minor 
importance because they were overridden by other aspects of the 
legal process.8 Like other legal realists, he avowed that "[a] legal 
system is not what it says, but what it does" (p. 336), and for 
him the largest determinant of what it does was procedural (p. 
367). Moreover, in his view our fact-finding procedures were 
badly flawed; beyond unavoidable sources of error, such as the 
fallibility of witnesses, he felt that we deliberately impeded ac-
curate fact-finding. Thus Frank repeatedly denounced: total reli-
ance on the parties to adduce the facts, especially when one party 
was too poor to do the job properly (pp. 440-41); rules of evidence 
whereby relevant information was excluded (p. 393); decision by 
juries, "casually selected groups of twelve persons, most of them 
untrained in the difficult art of fact-finding" (p. 338); myths 
about the impartiality of judges (p. 411); and other generally 
accepted features of our trial process. This so-called fact-
skepticism is by far the most common form of Frank's iconoclasm 
to find expression in his opinions. 
Frank's iconoclastic appeal extends also to his opinion-
writing style. In part this is a product of the intellectual charac-
teristics already mentioned-the extensive use of nonlegal mate-
rials, the witticisms and trenchant asides, the lengthy essays. 
Even more refreshing for readers impatient with the decorum of 
judicial discourse will be Frank's propensity to needle his adver-
saries, including judicial colleagues. In United States v. Antonelli 
Fireworks Co., for example, he accused the majority of suppres-
sing crucial facts {pp. 325, 327), of preferring "the pocketbook of 
8. I recognize Frank's express denial that he thought legal rules of"little importance" 
(p. 196), and I argue later, text following note 10 infra, that in practice he seemed to take 
rules seriously, but I still think that my statement accurately describes the genera'! 
tendency of his polemics. 
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an insurance company" to the liberty of an innocent criminal 
defendant (p. 334), and of merely pretending to deplore prosecu-
torial misconduct, "recalling the bitter tear shed by the Walrus 
as he ate the oysters" (p. 335). Frank did not spare any of his 
colleagues from such strictures, not even Judge Learned Hand, 
although it is likely that over the years his adversary, Judge 
Charles Clark, received Frank's hardest blows. 
To certain readers Frank's opinions will have yet another 
ground of appeal, linked to the last, and that is their liberal 
activism. Nearly everyone who writes about Frank comments on 
his strong sympathy for the poor and powerless, and this is borne 
out by the cases reproduced here. He denounced cowardly censor-
ship only of the "relatively inconspicuous" (p. 129), monopolistic 
conspiracies of employers against working people (p. 312), callous 
exploitation of Indians (pp. 431-34), and use of invalid patents to 
bully small competitors (p. 448). His strongest sympathies, how-
ever, were for criminal defendants. In case after case readers will 
find him abhorring the possibility that innocent people may be 
convicted-by false confessions wrongly extorted (pp. 364-65, 
371-73), by prosecutorial misconduct (pp. 336-37), by improper 
comments of judge to jury (pp. 421-22), by the confusions of a 
mass trial (p. 408), and the like .. With almost equal fervor he 
deplored the mistreatment of criminal suspects, for example, by 
oppressive interrogation (pp. 364-65, 371-73), invasion of privacy 
(pp. 357-58), or unwarranted subjection to trial (pp. 363-64). 
Frank's viewpoint in criminal cases is especially notable because 
it was shared only to a limited extent by Judge Learned Hand and 
hardly at all by the other judges on the Second Circuit, not even 
Judge Clark, a strong liberal in almost every other respect. 
Frank could express these liberal commitments most effec-
tively. One example from United States v. Rubenstein, concern-
ing the erroneous conviction of the innocent, should suffice. 
In a case like this, all our complicated judicial apparatus yields but 
a human judgment, not at all sure to be correct, affecting the life 
of another human being. If we are at all imaginative, we will com-
prehend what that judgment will mean to him, and what a horror 
it will be if we wrongly decide against him. To be sure, one can say 
that it does not pay to take too seriously the possibility that one 
man, more or less, may be unjustly imprisoned, considering the 
fact that [in World War II] millions have died and that the At-
omic Age . . . may end any minute in the destruction of all this 
planet's inhabitants. Yet (perhaps because I am growing old or 
because, despite my years, I have not fully matured) it seems to 
me that, if America's part in the war was meaningful and if man-
822 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 77:814 
kind's development has any significance against the background of 
eternity, then the dignity of each individual man is not an empty 
phrase. If it is not, then we judges, part of a human arrangement 
called government, should proceed with great caution when we 
determine whether a man is to be forcibly deprived of his liberty. 
[P. 324] 
There is also substantial reason for readers to conclude that 
Frank was a judicial activist, which is to say that in deciding 
cases he put his social commitments ahead oflegalistic considera-
tions. This is strongly suggested by his overt avowals. He repeat-
edly suggested that the main task of judges was to do justice in 
particular case_s (e.g., pp. 444-46). Moreover, he was prepared to 
translate this liberal platitude into specific doctrine. For exam-
ple, in Gardella u. Chandler he stated that, because the reserve 
clause was so repulsive, judges ought to do their best to distin-
guish the Supreme Court ruling that organized baseball was out-
side the Sherman Act {p. 312). And in United States u. Forness 
he expressly declined to apply established landlord-tenant law in 
large part by characterizing the dispute as one between poor Indi-
ans and exploitative whites {p. 429). 
The decisive test of activism, however, is results. Judged by 
the cases in this hook, Frank passed the test easily. In all but 
three, his "bottom line" (whether affirmed or reversed) was in 
accord with his liberal social preferences. Two of the remaining 
three cases involved communism, a matter to which I will return, 
and the third opinion, United States u. Roth, was a dissent from 
the criminal conviction in all but name. Moreover, it is my im-
pression that the cases in this book are representative of Frank's 
output as a whole. Compared to the other members of the Second 
Circuit, most of whom were moderate to liberal, Frank voted far 
more frequently in favor of criminal defendants and accused in-
fringers of ·monopolies, and as a champion of personal injury 
plaintiffs only Judge Clark was his equal. 
Frank adhered to his social commitments even when they 
conflicted with his views on fact-finding. In Skidmore u. Balti-
more & Ohio Railroad, he upheld a personal injury plaintiff 
at the expense of a request for a special verdict; in Keller u. 
Brooklyn Bus Corp., he did so by insisting on a technically perfect 
jury instruction. In at least two other cases here, he invoked rules 
that excluded relevant evidence in order to reverse criminal con-
victions. 9 
9. United States v. Rubenstein (pp. 318-24); United States v. On Lee (pp, 352,61); 
United States v. St. Pierre (pp. 383-94). 
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Thus far I have addressed potential readers who may be in-
clined to admire Frank's traits as a judge and opinion-writer. 
Others are apt to react differently. As in the past, some may find 
his parade of learning vain, his asides silly, his extended dis-
courses tedious, his attacks on others nasty. Frank's realism and 
liberalism inay strike some as exaggerated or shallow; his activ-
ism may seem inappropriate in a judge. I do not recommend this 
book to thoroughgoing traditionalists. 
And yet, upon closer examination both iconoclastic liberals 
and traditionalists may find Frank to be other than };ie seems. By 
the realist criterion that he, himself, avowed-"[a] legal system 
is not what it says, but what it does" (p. 336)-he was a fairly. 
conventional judge. 
Consider first Frank's avowed skepticism of legal rules and 
precedents; throughout this volume readers will nevertheless see 
him treating them seriously. He based his entire concurr~nce in 
United States v. Roth on his own restatement of the law of free 
speech (pp. 113-14). He attacked general verdicts in part because 
they made it easy for juries to ignore rules oflaw (pp. 261-62). He 
proposed carefully crafted doctrines for such subjects as harmless 
error (p. 328) and the waiver of fifth amendment rights (p. 384). 
He sought to root deeply in precedent his views on these matters 
and others such as prosecutorial misconduct, electronic eaves-
dropping, and inaccurate jury instructions (e.g., pp. 331-32, 397-
403, 414-15). In one case he attacked a majority view largely, he 
said, because it "may have wide precedential consequences" (p. 
397). 
Indeed, at times Frank put exaggerated reliance on rules and 
precedents. A common fallacy of the formalists, whom realists 
such as Frank attacked, was to move from authoritative general 
propositions to a resolution of specific questions with hardly any 
steps in between. Frank, himself, did this repeatedly. He applied 
Supreme Court denunciations of trial practices such as prosecu-
torial misconduct or erroneous jury instructions without any com-
parison of the facts of the cases (pp. 326, 414-15). To Congress he 
mechanically attributed policies he favored or opposed (pp. 317, 
430-31). Most striking was his seeming deference to the fifth 
amendment privilege and the sixth and seventh amendment 
guarantees of jury trial. Frank claimed to oppose trial by jury, 
especially in civil cases, as subversive of accurate fact-finding, 
and at least at the start of his judicial career he also questioned 
the use of privileges to exclude relevant evidence. Yet repeatedly 
he asserted that these policy considerations were totally overrid-
824 Michigan Law Review lVol. 77:814 
den by the very words of the Constitution, and thus he purported 
to solve such refined problems as formulation of the harmless 
error test and the precise point at which a witness waives his fifth 
amendment privilege (e.g., pp. 323, 391-93). Incidentally, it 
might be thought that Frank's treatment of these cases, though 
wooden, was highly principled. In each instance, however, the 
outcome Frank urged was to uphold a criminal defendant or a 
personal injury plaintiff. 
Readers may suppose that these excursions into traditional, 
even formalist, methods of opinion-writing were merely attempts 
to win assent from the less iconoclastic. If so, they were inconsis-
tent with Frank's usual tactlessness, exemplified by his sharp 
attacks on conventional judges and lawyers. They were also at 
war with his avowed devotion to honest dealing between the 
government and its citizens (p. 405). I think at least equally likely 
is Professor Karl Llewellyn's suggestion that professionally 
Frank had two authentic personalities; in jurisprudential po-
lemics he was a provocative radical, but as a man of affairs he 
was an orthodox (and able) practitioner.10 I would add to this 
observation my comments below concerning Frank's penchant 
for overargument, which would have led him to exaggerate both 
his theoretical rule-skepticism and his practical reliance on rules 
and precedents. It is also relevant that Frank's most extreme 
rule-skepticism dated from a decade before he became a judge. 
In the interim the social situation had changed and Frank had 
taken on a variety of practical responsibilities; by the end of that 
decade he was more interested in other causes. 
Frank's liberalism, too, was not as thoroughgoing as it may 
seem. As I mentioned before, two of the three cases in this book 
in which Frank voted against his usual social preferences involved 
communism-the prosecution of the Rosenbergs for espionage 
and the contempt conviction of Dashiell Hammett and two oth-
ers, sureties for four Communist leaders who jumped bail. And 
in Frank's most renowned case not in this book, United States v. 
Sacher, 11 he voted, over the dissent of Judge Clark, to uphold the 
contempt convictions of the defense lawyers at the Smith Act 
trial of the top Communist party officers. None of the cases in 
the book in which Frank followed his usual social proclivities 
concerned Communists. On purely quantitative grounds readers 
may have reason to conclude that Frank was considerably less 
10. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRAomoN 220 n.214, 511 (1960). 
11. 182 F.2d 416, 453-63 (2d Cir. 1950). 
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liberal than usual in criminal cases involving communism.12 
This conclusion, however, has to be tested by doctrinal anal-
ysis. Of the Communist-related cases on which Frank sat, proba-
bly the most significant for civil liberties was United States v. 
Rosenberg. Not only were there arguable claims that the trial had 
been unfair, but it ended in the unprecedented imposition by a 
civil court of the death penalty for espionage. Moreover, the case 
attracted widespread public attention and was appealed amidst 
a rising storm of anticommunism. The decision could not help 
but have a significant impact on the public understanding of the 
rule of law and the role of the courts in protecting that regime. 
The customary appraisal of Frank's conduct in the 
Rosenberg case is that it fit his liberal activism. He alone of the 
appellate judges voted to reverse the conviction of Morton So bell, 
the lesser defendant, and he did so for characteristic reasons. As 
for the Rosenbergs, it is said that he honestly, and reasonably, 
believed that they had received a fair trial. Still, in his majority 
opinion he conscientiously discussed each of their numerous 
claims at length. The death penalty he abhorred, so his admirers 
claim, and he would have reversed it if there had been any legal 
ground to do so, but he was foreclosed by irorrclad Supreme Court 
precedents. He did what he could for the liberal cause, neverthe.: 
less, by including in his opinion a powerful appeal to the Supreme 
Court to reconsider the precedents that bound him {pp. xv, 290). 
There is much to be said for this view, but there are grounds 
to object to it as well. Regarding the_ fairness of the trial, two of 
the Rosenbergs' claims were calculated to appeal strongly to 
Frank's concern about conviction of the innocent. They argued, 
with reason, that the trial judge had intervened in the questioning 
of witnesses so as to favor the prosecution; unfortunately, the-
examples Frank reproduced in a footnote to his opinion have been 
omitted from this book. The Rosenbergs also asserted, again with 
reason, that the repeated references during the trial to their radi-
cal political beliefs and membership in the Communist party, 
even if arguably relevant, unduly prejudiced their right to an 
impartial trial {pp. 294-97). Both claims, however, ran counter 
to Frank's views on the fact-finding process~ He felt that judges 
were considerably better fact-finders than jurors, and thus he was 
not averse to their intervening at trial (pp. 238-39). He also had 
12. See also the discussion of two other Frank opinions in M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S 
COURT 299-301 (1970). . 
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a strong predilection in favor of admitting all relevant evidence 
for appraisal by the fact-finder (p. 393). Yet as I have pointed out 
before, in other cases his concern for fair treatment of criminal 
defendants overrode these views. 13 
What seems clearly anomalous is Frank's repeated reliance 
on the trial judge's admonitions to the jury as a prophylactic for 
whatever dangers of unfairness lurked in these and other claims. 
At every other place in this volume in which Frank referred to 
judicial admonitions, he ridiculed them as useless and even 
harmful (pp. 333, 347, 350). To be sure, he acknowledged his 
usual view at one point in the Rosenberg opinion, but his only 
response was that the Rosenbergs had "made no effort to pro-
cure a trial by a judge alone" (p. 297). It is impossible to recon-
cile this harsh remark with Frank's repeated invocation in other 
contexts of the constitutional right to a jury trial. 14 
Turning to the death penalty, the crux of the Rosenbergs' 
position, even supposing they were guilty as charged, was that by 
far the most important of the secrets they stole were passed to a 
wartime ally, hardly a hanging crime. In legal terms this trans-
lated into a contention that the sentence was either an abuse of 
the trial judge's discretion or unconstitutional. In researching 
these claims, Frank discovered a third argument, unfortunately 
omitted from the opinion as reproduced in this volume, that 
under the circumstances the death penalty was not authorized by 
statute. The death penalty could only be given for espionage dur-
ing wartime; otherwise the maximum sentence was twenty years 
in prison. In terms of policy, the statutory argument was that 
Congress, in hiking the maximum punishment so drastically for 
wartime espionage, must have been thinking of passing secrets to 
enemies, not allies. Admittedly, there were tenable objections to 
this argument. The rest of the statute had already been held to 
apply to spying for friends as well as enemies, and the absence of 
an explicit distinction in the death penalty provision might point 
in the same direction. As a matter of policy, too, Congress might 
have felt that even disclosures to allies had to be deterred drasti-
cally in wai:time because of the danger of security leaks. My only 
13. See al~o United States v. Giallo, 206 F.2d 207, 211-13 (2d Cir. 1953) (dissenting 
opinion). 
14. Frank also repeatedly relied on the competence and conscientiousness of defense 
counsel and on statements by them at trial that the defendants had been treated fairly 
(pp. 294-95, 298, 304). These references display an insensitivity, extraordinary in Fronk, 
to the manifold difficulties-logistic anti tactical-confronting defense counsel in this 
case. See L. NlZER, THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRACY (1973). 
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point here is that the statutory argument against the death pen-
alty was very strong, an assessment shared by three astute faculty 
colleagues to whom I have put the problem. Yet Frank's entire 
response to the argument was, "[T]he legislative history con-
tains nothing to support such an interpretation. " 15 I conclude that 
although Frank may have opposed the death penalty in general, 
and may even have objected to it in this particular case, he did 
not search zealously for grounds on which he might overturn it 
as he did other criminal convictions that aroused his sense of 
injustice. 16 
If I am right that Frank behaved differently in the Rosenberg 
case, and perhaps in his other cases involving communism, read-
ers may wonder why. His long-time colleague and adversary, 
Judge Clark, wrote privately of Frank's "troublesome lack of 
forthrightness in the political or so-called 'Communist' cases"; 17 
by this I take him to have meant a lack of courage. The biogra-
pher of Learned Hand's Court, Marvin Schick, speculated that 
Frank had acquired a strong anti-Communist bias from his per-
sonal experience with aides in the New Deal.18 As an ardent ad-
mirer of Judge Learned Hand, Frank may have absorbed some of 
his mentor's judicial modesty in the face of a political storm as 
strong as McCarthyism. These are mere conjectures, however; we 
will not approach certainty without information of a more private 
character than has yet been published. 
In any event, Frank was sensitive to suggestions that he had 
let down the liberal side in the "big" cases of the early 1950s. 
Readers will find his feelings fully expressed in the speech enti-
tled, "On Holding Abe Lincoln's Hat," but they also surfaced in 
at least one case here. Reviewing a felony murder conviction in 
1955 he wrote, 
Recently many outstanding Americans have been much con-
cerned-and justifiably-with inroads on the constitutional privi-
leges of persons questioned about subversive activities. But con-
cern with such problems, usually those of fairly prominent persons, 
should not blind one to the less dramatic, less publicized plight of 
humble, inconspicuous men ... when unconstitutionally victim-
ized by officialdom. It will not do to say-as some do-that deep 
15. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 603 n.21 (2d Cir. 1952). 
16. Frank did not rely on the fact that the Rosenbergs had failed to raise the statutory 
point. To have done so would have been inconsistent with his approach in other cases ( e.g., 
p. 319). 
17. Letter from Judge Clark to Edmond Cahn (Feb. 25, 1958), reprinted in M. SCHICK, 
supra note 12, at 299. 
18. M. SCHICK, supra note 12, at 301-03. 
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concern with such problems of the humble is the mark of an "old-
fashioned liberal." For repeated and unredressed attacks on the 
constitutional liberties of the humble will tend to destroy the foun-
dations supporting the constitutional liberties of everyone. The 
test of the moral quality of a civilization is its treatment of the 
weak and powerless. [P. 374] 
Some potential readers of this volume may be consoled by 
the proposition that Frank was not as iconoclastic, or as liberal, 
as he appears. Another trait that close examination of this book 
reveals will hardly appeal to anyone. Frank had an unfortunate 
penchant for gross overargument, manifested in a variety of ways. 
He frequently resorted to exaggeration. He made glaringly falla-
cious and even absurd contentions. He often failed to grant seri-
ous difficulties in his own position. In some cases Frank's entire 
line of argument was hung from such devices. 
At the risk of tedium, I will try to provide enough clear-cut 
examples at least to establish that I am not being unfair to Frank. 
One fertile source is United States u. Roth, otherwise an admira-
ble opinion: 
(1) Frank claimed "it seems doubtful" that the first 
amendment was meant by the framers to leave room for an ob-
scenity statute. His entire evidence is that Franklin, "father of 
the Post Office," wrote two ribald works; that Jefferson extolled 
Franklin and wrote approvingly of one of those works; that Madi-
son also admired Franklin and himself told Rabelaisian anec-
dotes; and that Madison, with Jefferson's encouragement, intro-
duced what became the first amendment (pp. 117-18). 
(2) Frank argued that if the obscenity statute was valid on 
its face, it must logically be applied to press accounts of sexual 
crimes (pp. 128-29). He declined even to consider the possibility 
of doctrinal developments that would fairly distinguish such ma-
terial from hard-core pornography.19 
(3) To his credit, Frank raised the difficult and important 
question, often ignored, whether "artistic" speech was protected 
by the first amendment. His affirmative response, however, 
rested solely on an ambiguous sentence from the 1774 address of 
the Continental Congress to the inhabitants of Quebec, plus as-
sorted warnings about the impact of censorship on innovative art 
(pp. 136-37). 
(4) Frank claimed that the obscenity statute was void for 
vagueness because even judges could not agree on its meaning. 
19. Compare, for example, Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). 
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His sole ground for saying so was that a part of the definition of 
obscenity-whose lust had to be aroused-had once changed {pp. 
138-39). 
Another fertile source of examples of Frank's propensity for 
overargument is the harmless error cases, particularly United 
States v. Rubenstein and United States v. Antonelli Fireworks 
Co.: 
(1) In only one of the four cases did the majority find error 
at trial; in the others it had no occasion to apply a harmless error 
test. Therefore, Frank was attacking the majority for failing to 
justify something it had not done. This is most evident in 
Rubenstein, in which Frank accused Judge Learned Hand of vir-
tual double-talk as to the ground of his decision {p. 320). 
· (2) Frank repeatedly claimed that the majority's test of 
harmless error was whether it personally believed the defendant 
to be guilty (e.g., pp. 320, 328-29). Yet the express position of the 
majority in genuine harmless error cases was much more com-
plex, involving both the weight of the evidence against the defen-
dant and the seriousriess of the error; the resulting test was con-
siderably stricter than Frank suggested. 20 Nor did Frank come 
near showing that what the majority did was different from what 
it said, and at least in the case of Judge Learned Hand, an in-
tensely honest and self-aware judge, the proposition would have 
been inherently implausible. 
(3) Coupled with the last point was Frank's contention in 
Antonelli Fireworks that unless the court treated all errors as 
harmful or adopted his slightly less drastic test-was the evi-
dence "so 'strong' that no sensible jury, had there been no error, 
would conceivably have acquitted, as for instance where the de-
fendant in his testimony in effect admits his guilt" -the court 
was "[n]ecessarily" deciding merely according to its own view 
of the defendant's guilt {p. 328). This simplistic analysis omitted 
a large middle ground, one piece of which had been staked out 
by the majority. 
( 4) Especially in Antonelli Fireworks Frank insisted that 
the Supreme Court had adopted his test of harmless error. The 
evidence he adduced at most showed only that the Court had 
rejected the extreme alternative of deciding merely according to 
its own view of guilt or innocence (pp. 331-32). 
Finally, here are a half-dozen examples, by no means exhaus-
20. See cases reproduced or noted in THE ART AND CRAFT OF JUDGING: THE DECISIONS 
OF JUDGE LEARNED HAND 253-63 (H. Shanks ed. 1968). 
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tive, from other cases: 
(1) Baseball's reserve clause forbids players to play on any 
professional team other than the one with which they first con-
tracted, except when the right to hire them was transferred to 
another team. In Gardella v. Chandler, Frank foolishly described 
this arrangement as "shockingly repugnant to moral principles 
that, at least since the War Between the States, have been basic 
in America ... virtual slavery" {p. 312). 
(2) In United States v. Leviton, defense counsel objected to 
the introduction of part of a codefendant's confession but did not 
make it clear whether he wanted it excluded altogether or merely 
sought a cautionary instruction. The trial judge understood the 
latter, sustained the objection, and promised to give an appropri-
ate instruction. Defense counsel never claimed until the appeal 
that he had been misunderstood. 21 Yet without acknowledging the 
slightest uncertainty, Frank asserted that counsel had asked for 
exclusion of the passage altogether {p. 347). 
(3) In United States v. On Lee, an informer entered the 
shop of a drug suspect and had an incriminating conversation 
with him. µistead of merely reporting what was said to a police-
man afterward, the informer broadcast the conversation to the 
policeman by means of a hidden radio. In dissent, Frank equated 
these facts to George Orwell's description in 1984 of the telescreen 
compulsorily installed in every house. He absurdly concluded, 
"My colleagues' decision, by legitimizing the use of such a future 
horror, invites it" (pp. 359-60). 
( 4) In United States v. St. Pierre, Frank relied very heavily 
on a state court decision concerning the privilege against self-
incrimination (p. 387). The majority, through Judge Learned 
Hand, had made it clear that the decision was unique and contra-
dicted by those of numerous other courts, yet Frank never alluded 
to this fact in his dissent. 
(5) In the same case, Frank made the tenable suggestion 
that relatively specific constitutional clauses ought to be given a 
more rigorous interpretation. On this ground he argued, plausibly 
enough, for strict enforcement of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Yet as a former New Dealer he could not resist 
characterizing the equally specific obligation-of-contracts clause 
as a relatively vague provision that should be applied leniently 
(pp. 392-93). 
21. United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 864 n.10 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opin-
ion). 
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(6) In Keller v. Brooklyn Bus Corp., the trial judge first 
gave a blurred but arguably inaccurate instruction on the burden 
of proof for contributory negligence and later adopted a clear and 
accurate statement of the same matter. On appeal the majority· 
mentioned that the correct statement came at the end of the trial 
judge's charge. Frank astutely responded, "But what justification 
is there for believing that the last words in a speech are invariably 
the ones most heeded by the audience?" (p. 417). Yet in Antonelli 
Fireworks, with the shoe on the other foot, he accused the prose-
cutor of "bearing in mind an ancient observation, 'If you want to 
excite prejudice you must do so at the close, so that the jurors 
may more easily remember what you said' " (p. 326). 
I do not, myself, mean to exaggerate. I have already men-
tioned that this volume repeatedly exhibits Frank's mastery of 
traditional legal skills. The reader can also find demonstrations 
of balance and candor. For example, Frank qualified in major 
ways the extreme views on obscenity of his ally, Judge Curtis Bok 
(p. 138); he recited important psychological objections to the spe-
cial verdict (p. 269); his discussion of judicial bias in In re J.P. 
Linahan, Inc., was remarkably sensitive; he expressly conceded 
at least a limited value to general rules of law and stare decisis 
(pp. 444, 446). Indeed, some of the opinions in this volume were 
argued solidly pretty much from start to finish. Of the individual 
opinions I especially recommend United States ex rel. Leyra v. 
Denno and United States v. Field. 
It is also true that many of Frank's excesses would probably 
pass unnoticed by the ordinary reader, and at least to this extent 
they were not harmful. Yet there were some who noted them and 
were greatly offended. The most significant was a colleague, 
Judge Clark, who privately complained about Frank's "tendency 
to ascribe fairly unconscionable positions to his colleagues against 
their openly stated views, preparatory to the demolition of the 
straw men thus created."22 , 
The simplest explanation of Frank's penchant for overargu-
ment is excessive zeal for his social goals-fair play for criminal 
defendants and the like. Yet the two friends who wrote the intro-
duction and preface to this volume portray Frank, not as an 
extremist, but as a person who kept his commitments in per-
spective. This is also the way Frank viewed himself. He wrote, 
I have no respect for the humorless self-righteous sort of person 
who has a firm conviction that always he alone, of the entire regi-
22. Quoted in M. ScmcK, supra note 12, at 276. 
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ment, is in step. Accordingly, when all my colleagues (whom I 
consider among the ablest of judges) repeatedly arrive at a certain 
conclusion, my sense of humor usually downs my doubts and 
nudges me into acquiescence. [P. 325] 
Another of his friends' characterizations of Frank may bring 
us closer to the explanation. Both stress his love of advocacy, 
reflected in his penchant for "using every available proof and 
argument" (p. x), his "knack of reducing complicated records to 
simple terms" (p. xix). I sense that this love of advocacy was 
generally joined much more closely to ebullient playfulness and 
a desire to shine than to hostility toward adversaries. In any 
event, I suggest that when Frank sat down to draft an opinion on 
a controversial subject, he was seized with an impulse to over-
whelm the opposition, and driven by this impulse he lost his self-
restraint. 
More will be known about such matters when private sources 
of information are made public. Marvin Schick, who had access 
to some of these sources, recounts an important incident that 
tends to support my view. In United States u. Sacher, 23 the con-
tempt proceeding against defense counsel arising out of the Smith 
Act prosecution of the top Communist leaders, Frank wrote a 
concurring opinion, upholding the convictions, that displayed his 
usual excesses. Yet as Schick reveals, Frank's first inclination was 
to overturn the convictions; he apparently had to be talked 
around by Judge Augustus Hand. Moreover, the first published 
version of his concurring opinion was relatively mild; he used the 
occasion of a petition for rehearing to stiffen it considerably. 24 My 
impression is that the excesses of the final version were a product, 
not of Frank's deep-seated commitment to the outcome, but of 
psychic steam generated by the process of espousing his view-
point. The fact that his perennial adversary, Judge Clark, was on 
the other side added to the pleasure of combat. 
Yet readers should not judge Frank's balance and candor 
wholly by these writings. The introduction and preface to the 
volume testify that in person he was affectionate, lovable, and 
sympathetic, never rancorous, able to laugh at himself, accept 
criticism, and admit his own errors. Justice Frankfurter made 
this point explicitly. "To have known Jerome Frank only through 
his writings was not to have known him. On paper he appeared 
prickly and pugilistic; in personal relations he was warm-hearted 
23. 182 F.2d 416, 453-63 (2d Cir. 1950) (concurring opinion). 
24. M. SCHICK, supra note 12, at 291-96. 
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and generous. " 25 
Professor Llewellyn, a long-time colleague and partial adver-
sary of Frank, wrote of him after his death, "[A]lmost great. " 26 
I find that a just judgment, and ample reason for readers to 
consult this book. 
25. OF LAW AND LIFE AND OTHER TmNas THAT MATTER 100 (P. Kurland ed. 1969). 
26. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 10, at 220 n.214. 
